
Bangladesh often presents the Chittagong Hill Tracts as a land of green mountains, beautiful lakes, forests and extraordinary natural scenery. Tourists admire its landscapes, photographers capture its beauty, and the government frequently promotes its development potential. Yet behind these picturesque images lies another story: one of Indigenous peoples, lost ancestral lands, political struggles, military conflict and a peace agreement whose most important promises remain disputed nearly three decades after it was signed.
The Chittagong Hill Tracts, commonly known as the CHT, is located in southeastern Bangladesh, bordering India and Myanmar. It consists of three administrative districts: Rangamati, Khagrachhari and Bandarban. Covering approximately 13,300 square kilometers, nearly one-tenth of Bangladesh’s territory, the region had a population of approximately 1.84 million according to the 2022 national census.
What makes the region distinctive is its Indigenous and ethnic diversity. The Chittagong Hill Tracts is home to at least 13 Indigenous and other ethnic communities, including the Chakma, Marma, Tripura, Tanchangya, Mro, Bawm, Chak, Khumi, Khyang, Santal, Rakhine, Pankho and Lushai. Eleven are traditionally identified as the region’s principal Indigenous hill peoples, while Santal and Rakhine communities are also part of its wider ethnic landscape. Each community possesses its own cultural identity, language, traditions and customary practices, contributing to the remarkable diversity of this mountainous region.
According to the official 2022 census figures, Indigenous and other recognized ethnic communities accounted for approximately 49.94 percent of the region’s population, while Bengalis accounted for 50.06 percent. However, the accuracy of these figures has been questioned. A technical study authored by Raja Devasish Roy and hosted by the International Fund for Agricultural Development identified an apparent undercount in the published census tables and calculated that Indigenous inhabitants represented approximately 53.74 percent of the regional population.
These differing figures are more than a statistical disagreement. They illustrate why the demographic history of the Chittagong Hill Tracts remains politically sensitive. For Indigenous communities, population changes are closely connected to questions of land ownership, political representation, cultural identity and their future in their ancestral homeland.
The Indigenous peoples of the region practice Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity and traditional spiritual beliefs. Their cultural identities are expressed through languages, religious ceremonies, traditional clothing, customary institutions, music, food and festivals. Despite sharing a homeland, these communities are not culturally identical, and each has its own history and traditions.
Many identify collectively as Jumma, a term associated with jhum, the traditional practice of shifting cultivation. Over time, Jumma became more than a reference to agriculture. It developed into an expression of shared identity and political solidarity among distinct Indigenous communities seeking recognition and protection of their rights.
Culture remains a powerful source of continuity. The Chakma celebrate Biju, the Marma observe Sangrai, and the Tripura celebrate Baisuk. These traditional New Year celebrations bring families and communities together through distinctive rituals and festivities. Weddings, religious observances and other traditional ceremonies also preserve cultural knowledge across generations.
But the Chittagong Hill Tracts cannot be understood through festivals, tourism or natural beauty alone. Its modern history has been shaped by successive changes in political authority, displacement, demographic transformation and demands for meaningful self-government.
During British colonial rule, the region was administered differently from much of Bengal. The Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulation of 1900 established a special administrative framework that recognized aspects of local customary institutions and placed restrictions on outside settlement and land transfers. Although the system remained under colonial authority, it acknowledged that the region’s social and administrative circumstances differed from those of the surrounding plains.
When British India was partitioned in 1947, the Chittagong Hill Tracts became part of East Pakistan, despite its predominantly non-Muslim Indigenous population at the time. This decision placed the region within a new political structure that would profoundly affect its future.
One of the most devastating events occurred during Pakistan’s rule. Construction of the Kaptai hydroelectric dam, completed in the early 1960s, created a vast artificial lake that submerged approximately 54,000 acres of agricultural land. Around 100,000 people were displaced, most of them Indigenous inhabitants whose homes, farmland and traditional livelihoods were destroyed or severely disrupted.
Some displaced families crossed into India, while others attempted to rebuild their lives elsewhere in the hills. For Pakistan’s government, the Kaptai Dam was a major hydroelectric development project. For many Indigenous families, however, it became a symbol of development achieved at the cost of their ancestral lands.
The consequences did not end with the flooding. Agricultural land was already limited in the mountainous region, and the loss of fertile valleys intensified competition over land. The displacement also weakened communities whose economic activities, cultural institutions and social relationships depended on longstanding connections to particular places.
Following Bangladesh’s independence in 1971, Indigenous political leaders demanded recognition of the region’s distinctive identity and greater regional autonomy. The Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti, commonly known as the PCJSS, emerged as a major political organization representing these demands.
Relations between the government and Indigenous political movements deteriorated. During the late 1970s and 1980s, government-sponsored settlement programs brought large numbers of Bengali families from the plains into the Chittagong Hill Tracts. These policies contributed to substantial demographic changes and intensified disputes over land and political representation.
The conflict developed into an armed confrontation between the Bangladesh government and the Shanti Bahini, the armed wing of the PCJSS. For more than two decades, the region experienced military operations, displacement, communal tensions and serious allegations of human rights violations.
Ordinary people paid a heavy price. Families lost relatives, villages experienced insecurity, and thousands of Indigenous inhabitants fled their homes or sought refuge in neighboring India. Armed conflict also damaged relations between Indigenous and Bengali communities, creating divisions that remain difficult to resolve.
A historic opportunity for peace emerged on December 2, 1997, when the Bangladesh government and the PCJSS signed the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord. The agreement sought to end the armed conflict through political negotiations and establish special arrangements for regional administration, land dispute resolution and the protection of the region’s distinctive characteristics.
Importantly, the Accord was signed within the constitutional framework, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bangladesh. It did not demand independence or establish a separate state. Instead, it recognized that a region with a distinct history and population required specific institutional arrangements to address its longstanding political grievances.
The agreement provided for the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council, strengthened the responsibilities of the three Hill District Councils, and addressed land disputes, the rehabilitation of displaced people and the withdrawal of temporary military camps under specified conditions. It also recognized the importance of preserving Indigenous culture and ensuring participation in regional administration.
The Accord was therefore more than a ceasefire agreement. It represented a political settlement intended to address some of the underlying causes of conflict. Its success was supposed to be measured not simply by the absence of war but by the restoration of rights, confidence and meaningful regional governance.
The agreement also explicitly states that it remains valid until all the measures provided for under its terms have been carried out. That provision is particularly important because it makes clear that the Accord was not intended to become irrelevant simply through the passage of time.
Nearly three decades later, however, its implementation remains deeply contested.
On September 10, 2026, Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs Minister Sa Ching Prue Jerry told Bangladesh’s Parliament that 65 of the Accord’s 72 provisions had been fully implemented, with work continuing on the remaining seven. The PCJSS and Indigenous rights organizations have repeatedly challenged government assessments of progress, maintaining that several of the Accord’s most important commitments remain unfulfilled.
International scrutiny has reinforced concerns about implementation. In an observation adopted in 2025 and published in 2026, the International Labour Organization’s Committee of Experts identified continuing issues concerning the settlement of land disputes, elections to the Hill District Councils and Regional Council, and the harmonization of relevant legislation. While acknowledging the government’s reported progress, the committee continued to seek information about the unresolved questions.
These concerns go to the heart of the agreement. Creating administrative institutions is not enough if they cannot exercise the powers intended for them. Likewise, counting completed provisions cannot by itself establish whether the political purpose of the Accord has been achieved.
Land remains among the most sensitive unresolved questions. The Chittagong Hill Tracts Land Dispute Resolution Commission was intended to address competing claims and longstanding grievances. Yet Indigenous communities continue to report problems involving land occupation, disputed ownership, displacement and inadequate recognition of customary landholding practices.
For Indigenous families, land is not simply property that can be exchanged or compensated through financial payments. It is connected to ancestral identity, community life, religious traditions, agriculture and cultural survival. Losing ancestral land can mean losing far more than an economic asset.
Another major disagreement concerns the role of military and intelligence institutions in regional affairs. Bangladesh has legitimate responsibilities to maintain national security, protect its borders and safeguard its citizens. However, Indigenous political leaders argue that land rights, local governance and implementation of the Accord should be addressed primarily through the institutions established or strengthened by the agreement.
This debate intensified in September 2026 when the government established three new committees dealing with Chittagong Hill Tracts affairs. The PCJSS criticized their creation, while the International Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission and the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs raised concerns that their composition and responsibilities could strengthen the influence of military and intelligence institutions at the expense of Accord-related regional bodies.
The controversy reflects a deeper political question. Should the Chittagong Hill Tracts continue to be approached primarily through national security arrangements, or should the government prioritize the civilian institutions and political settlement already provided for in the 1997 Accord?
Development presents a similar challenge. Roads, schools, hospitals, electricity, communications and economic opportunities are essential for the region’s future. Indigenous communities need these services as much as anyone else. But development should not become a justification for ignoring customary land rights, displacing families or excluding local communities from decisions that directly affect their lives.
The Chittagong Hill Tracts also faces cultural and educational challenges. Indigenous languages need greater opportunities for preservation and use in education. Young people require access to quality schooling, employment and higher education without being forced to abandon their cultural identities. Traditional knowledge and community institutions deserve recognition alongside modernization.
The region is not politically or culturally uniform. Indigenous communities have different histories, priorities and religious traditions. Bengali residents also possess legitimate rights and interests. Any durable solution must protect all inhabitants while respecting the special institutional arrangements and Indigenous protections recognized in the Accord.
The distinction is important. Protecting Indigenous rights does not require denying the rights of Bengali citizens. Equally, protecting the rights of Bengali residents must not be used as a reason to disregard Indigenous history, customary land rights or the commitments made through a negotiated peace agreement.
For international readers, the Chittagong Hill Tracts deserves attention beyond occasional reports of violence, military operations or tourism. Its history raises questions relevant to many societies: how a state should protect distinct Indigenous populations, how development should be balanced with ancestral rights, and whether political agreements can deliver lasting peace without full implementation.
The future of the Chittagong Hill Tracts should not be defined by permanent confrontation. Its people need security, education, economic opportunities, justice and functioning public institutions. But these goals cannot be separated from the historical grievances and political commitments that brought the region to the negotiating table in 1997.
The Indigenous peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts are not asking history to stand still. They want to participate in the modern world while retaining the languages, cultures, institutions and rights inherited from their ancestors. Their aspirations should not be incompatible with citizenship in Bangladesh.
The 1997 Accord offered a path toward reconciliation. It demonstrated that even a prolonged armed conflict could be addressed through negotiation and political compromise. The challenge today is not to invent another framework while leaving the existing one incomplete, but to make the agreed settlement meaningful in practice.
Nearly three decades have passed since that historic agreement. The people who experienced the worst years of conflict are growing older, while younger generations are inheriting unresolved disputes that began long before they were born.
A peace agreement should not become a historical document remembered only during anniversary speeches. Its promises should be visible in the lives of the people for whom it was signed.
The Chittagong Hill Tracts does not need another promise of peace. It needs the promises already made to be honored.
Sources and Further Reading:
Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs, Government of Bangladesh — Regional Background
https://mochta.gov.bd/pages/static-pages/694032e735ce18e1c05641c4Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics — Population and Housing Census 2022, including Chittagong Hill Tracts demographic highlights
https://bbs.portal.gov.bd/site/page/d551779e-1bee-42b2-9c31-08dc8db4c301International Fund for Agricultural Development — Country Technical Note on Indigenous Peoples’ Issues, Bangladesh, by Raja Devasish Roy
https://ioe.ifad.org/documents/d/new-ifad.org/bangladesh_ctn-pdfUnited Nations Peacemaker — Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord, December 2, 1997
https://peacemaker.un.org/en/node/9084International Labour Organization — Observation on Bangladesh’s Implementation of Convention No. 107, adopted 2025 and published 2026
https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:13100:0::NO::P13100_COMMENT_ID,P13100_COUNTRY_ID:4464553,103500The Business Standard — 65 of 72 CHT Peace Accord Provisions Implemented: Minister, September 10, 2026
https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/65-72-cht-peace-accord-provisions-implemented-minister-1539361International Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission and International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs — Joint Statement on New CHT Committees, September 2026
https://www.iwgia.org/en/news/joint-statement-chtc-and-iwgia-deeply-concerned-over-bnp-governments-policies-that-risk-further-entrenching-military-control-and-undermining-the-cht-accordInternational Rivers — The Kaptai Dam: A Story of Disenfranchisement, Displacement and Destruction
https://www.internationalrivers.org/news/the-kaptai-dam-a-story-of-disenfranchisement-displacement-and-destruction/Purna Lal Chakma — Who Are the Indigenous People of the Chittagong Hill Tracts?
https://purnalalchakma.com/indigenous-people-chittagong-hill-tracts/

